INTRODUCTION THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF DECISION under risk and uncertainty combines the
principle of mathematical expectation with the assumption of decreasing marginal utility, which jointly imply risk aversion. Three clusters of phenomena reflecting risk attitudes have challenged the descriptive validity of the classical theory. First, although risk aversion is prevalent, there are situations in which risk seeking is commonly observed. Gambling is a case in point. Second, there is a considerable body of evidence that preferences between risky prospects are not linear in the probabilities. The certainty effect, demonstrated by Allais, is the best-known example of this phenomenon. Third, people's preferences depend not only on the degree of uncertainty but also on the source of uncertainty. For instance, people sometimes prefer to bet on known rather than unknown probabilities, as demonstrated by Ellsberg. There have been many attempts to explain risk attitudes that are inconsistent with expected utility. Much recent work has been devoted to theories that extend expected utility by introducing nonadditive decision weights (Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Quiggin (1982) , Yaari (1987) , Gilboa (1987) , Schmeidler (1989) , Luce and Fishburn (1991) ). In these models, preferences are determined jointly by the utility function that measures the subjective value of the outcomes, and by the decision weights that capture what may be called chance attitude.
In this article we present a theoretical analysis of decision weights that is motivated by the observed pattern of risk seeking, nonlinear preferences, and source dependence. This pattern suggests an S-shaped weighting function that overweights small probabilities and underweights moderate and high probabilities (Section 2). The theoretical framework used in this paper is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 establishes the properties of the preference order that are necessary and sufficient for an S-shaped weighting function. This analysis is extended to uncertainty in Section 5. In analogy to the Pratt/Arrow analysis of comparative risk aversion, Section 6 introduces the relation more-SA-than between the weighting functions of different individuals, which reflects departure from expected utility. Section 7 introduces a method for comparing the weighting function of the same individual for different sources of uncertainty. This method is used to analyze the observed relation between risk and uncertainty. Proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
THE FOURFOLD PA7TFERN
In order to motivate the present development, we first illustrate some common features of people's attitude toward risk. Consider simple prospects of the form (x, p) that offer $x with probability p, and nothing otherwise. The study of choice between simple risky prospects has given rise to the fourfold pattern illustrated in Table I . These data are taken from a study by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) in which each subject made a series of choices between a risky prospect and various cash offers. The value of C(x, p) is the median cash offer (in dollars) that was indifferent to the prospect (x, p). Table I exhibits risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability combined with risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of high probability. This pattern has been observed in numerous studies, with and without contingent payoffs (Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) , Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Hershey and Schoemaker (1980), Payne, Laughhunn, and Crum (1981), Cohen, Jaffray, and Said (1987), Wehrung (1989) , Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). Extreme risk seeking for long shots has recently been reported by Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) in an experiment conducted in China with real payoffs that were considerably higher than the subjects' normal monthly income. Risk seeking for small probabilities of gains is consistent with common observations of gambling and risky ventures, whereas risk seeking for high-probability losses is consistent with the tendency to accept a risk in order to avoid a sure loss.
Friedman and Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952) have attempted to explain the combination of risk seeking and risk aversion in terms of a utility function with both concave and convex regions. However, because the fourfold pattern arises over a wide range of payoffs, it cannot be explained by the utility function for money. Instead, it suggests a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale. Suppose the value of the prospect (x, p) is given by w(p)v(x), where v is the value function for gains and losses, and w is a nonlinear weighting function. Figure 1 presents a typical weighting function obtained by Tversky and Fox (1994) . This function exhibits diminishing sensitivity: it is steepest near the endpoints and shallower in the middle, yielding overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting of middle and high probabilities. Thus, people underestimate the impact of an increase in probability from 20% to 25% in comparison to an increase from 0% to 5% or from 95% to 100%. Such a weighting function gives rise to the fourfold pattern described above, under plausible assumptions concerning the value function.
BASIC CONCEPTS
We first introduce terminology and notation, and then describe the theoretical framework used in the paper. We distinguish decision under risk, where the probabilities are assumed to be known, and decision under uncertainty, where the probabilities associated with the various outcomes are not given in advance. In both cases, the decision maker has to select between prospects that are described as positive or negative changes with respect to the status quo. To simplify matters, we assume that the outcomes are real numbers designating money, and interpret 0 as the status quo. Gains refer to positive outcomes, and losses refer to negative outcomes. In decision under risk a prospect is described by a finite probability distribution. Thus (x1, Pt1; ... ; Xn, Pn) is the risky prospect yielding outcome xj with probability pj, j = 1,..., n; the pj's are nonnegative and sum to one. If there is only one nonzero outcome then the zero outcome is suppressed; for example, (Z, 1/2) is the prospect that yields Z with probability 1/2 and 0 with probability 1/2. Decision under uncertainty is described in terms of a set S, called the state space. We assume that exactly one state obtains, but the decision maker is uncertain about this state. Subsets of S are called events; S -A is the complement to A. In decision under uncertainty, prospects are functions from S to RO, taking finitely many values. If state s obtains, then prospect f yields the outcome f(s). An uncertain prospect is described as (x1, A1; .. .; Xn, An), where (A1,..., A,) is a partition of S and xi is the outcome associated with the states in Ai. As above, the zero outcome is suppressed if there is only one nonzero outcome; thus (x, A) is the prospect that yields x if A obtains, and 0 if it does not.
Risk can be considered as a special case of uncertainty where probabilities are given for the events in S, and prospects that generate the same probability distribution over the outcomes are treated as identical. In this case, each prospect is described by the probability distribution it induces over the outcomes, with no reference to the state space.
We identify outcomes with degenerate prospects. Thus x can be viewed as a constant function assigning outcome x to all states or as a degenerate probability distribution assigning probability 1 to that outcome. Let a denote the preference relation over prospects; the relations >-, are defined as usual.
Cumulative Prospect Theory
This article adopts the theoretical framework of cumulative prospect theory, or CPT for short (Tversky and Kahneman (1992) ). This theory is more general than the rank-dependent utility model because it permits a different treatment of gains and losses. 
SUBADDITIVITY IN CHOICE UNDER RISK
In this article we focus on the weighting function for gains. The analysis for losses is essentially identical and, with few exceptions, will not be discussed separately. Thus we restrict attention to nonnegative outcomes, and suppress the superscript in w+ and W+. This section discusses risk; uncertainty is discussed in following sections.
The weighting function presented in Figure 1 From the second preference above it follows by dominance that the same probability shift (.10 from 100 to 0 on the right) yields There are two approaches for testing SA, axiomatic and parametric. Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1994) found that in its general form the comonotonic independence axiom, which underlies all rank-dependent models, did not fare better than the independence axiom of expected utility, but "CPT with its S-shaped w-function provides the best description of the choice patterns ob- It is noteworthy that lower SA accounts for the observed tendency (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) to undervalue probabilistic insurance that reduces the probability of a loss, say from p to p72, relative to regular insurance that reduces it from p to 0.
In order to characterize the degree of departure from expected utility theory, it is useful to devise a measure of the degree of SA. To this end, define for given p, q satisfying p + q < 1 and the appropriate boundary conditions, We conclude the section with several empirical observations. Table II illustrates both upper and lower SA, and provides a novel counterexample to expected utility that does not involve independence or substitution. Table II shows that for the gain prospects the majority choice favored f' over g', f" over g", and g over f, although f =f' +f" and g =g' +g". Furthermore, (f', f", g) was the single most popular pattern for gains, exhibited by 31% of the subjects. This pattern violates expected utility, but is consistent with SA. To verify this, note that lower SA implies W(A1 UA4) < W(A1) + W(A4). Furthermore, if upper SA exceeds lower SA (i.e., E' = 0 can be taken), as is comm6nly the case, then 1 > W(A1 UA2) + W(A3 UA4) follows. Therefore, V(f) < V(f') + V(f") but V(g) > V(g') + V(g" ), where V(f ) denotes the value of prospect f according to CPT. Hence the observed pattern is consistent with CPT. Because the data exhibit SA in a strict sense, they are inconsistent with expected utility theory, in which (setting the utility of 0 to 0) all the above inequalities should be equalities.
Note that the modal preferences for the loss prospects are the mirror image of the preferences for the gain prospects, again exhibiting SA in the strict sense contrary to expected utility. Here, (g', g", f) was the single most popular pattern, exhibited by 35% of the subjects. This pattern is consistent with the reflection assumption (W+ = W-), claracterized in Appendix B.13
Although SA is a plausible condition for decision under uncertainty, it is unlikely to hold in some special circumstances in which the union of disjoint events is less "vague" than its constituents. For example, consider an urn with one hundred green and red balls in unknown proportion, which are numbered from 1 to 100. Then the events "even and red" and "even and green" are vague, but their union "even" is no longer vague. If, as suggested by Ellsberg (1961) , people prefer to bet on known probabilities, defined by the numbers, rather than on the unknown probabilities involving colors, then SA may not hold in such situations.
COMPARATIVE SUBADDITIVITY
The relation more-concave-than or more-risk-averse-than between utility functions of different individuals was introduced and characterized by Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) . This relation orders individuals by their departure from the (objective) expected value. In this section we develop a similar analysis for weighting functions. Specifically, we introduce and characterize the relation of more-SA-than between the weighting functions of different individuals, which orders them by their departure from expected utility theory. If this theory is taken as the standard of rational behavior, then the more-SA-than relation can be interpreted as an ordering by departure from rationality.
As in Section 4, the present treatment extends previous work (Yaari (1987), Chew, Karni, and Safra (1989), Chew (1989), Chateauneuf (1991), Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994), Wakker (1994)) by considering S-shaped rather than convex weighting functions, and by comparing weighting functions independently of the value functions. 13 The modal choices in Table II 
1-W1(S -C) = W1(A y B) -WJ1(A) implies 1-W2(S -C) ? W2(A U B) -W2(A)
The boundary condition for (6.5) is: W1(A U B) < W1(S -E) for some boundary event E; the boundary condition for (6.6) is: WJ1(A) ? W(E') for a boundary event E'. The relation of E and E' to the boundary constants for the transformation carrying W1 into W2 is given in (A3) and (A4) in the Appendix.
Next we present the corresponding preference conditions for the proposition that >2 is more SA than >1 . We require three conditions. First, for all events A, B, whenever 0 <x <X, 0 <y < Y, and A ,1 E' for the boundary event E'. The interpretation of (6.8) and (6.9) is essentially identical to that of (6.3) and (6.4). PROPOSITION 6.2: Under Assumption 3.1 (for both >1 and ,2 ), the following three statements are equivalent:15 (i) W2 is more SA than W1; (ii) conditions (6.5), (6.6), and (6.7) are satisfied; (iii) conditions (6.7), (6.8), and (6.9) are satisfied.
SOURCE DEPENDENCE
Perhaps the most persistent objection to expected utility theory concerns the distinction between risk and uncertainty. The expectation principle, it has been argued, can be applied to decision under risk where probabilities are known but not to decision under uncertainty or ignorance where the probabilities are unknown. This view, advanced by several authors, notably Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921) , has been underscored by Ellsberg (1961) , who argued convincingly that people prefer to bet on an urn that contains an equal number of green and red balls than on an urn that contains red and green balls in an unknown proportion. Numerous experiments have confirmed this hypothesis; see Camerer and Weber (1992) for a review. More generally, there is evidence that people's preferences depend not only on their degree of uncertainty but also on the source of uncertainty. This phenomenon has been called source dependence.
In this section we distinguish two aspects of source dependence, which we call source preference and source sensitivity. Let v and v be two distinct families of events. For example, one family may be generated by spinning a roulette wheel, the other by the possible outcomes of a horse race. We shall refer to such families as sources. We assume that the families are closed under union and complementation, and are rich in the sense that they both satisfy solvability. In decision under risk, we interpret the uncertainty as generated by a standard random device. Although probabilities could be realized by various random devices, we do not distinguish between them and treat risk as a single source.
Source Preference
In the domain of gains, the decision maker exhibits a general preference for To extend source preference to negative outcomes, we start with the preference condition. A preference to bet on source v rather than W means that (-x , A) -(-x, B) implies (-x, S-A) a (-x, S-B for all disjoint events A1, A2 in v and disjoint events B1, B2 in -V satisfying the following boundary conditions. In (7.1), W+(A1 uA2) < W+(S -E) for some boundary event E; in (7.2), W+(S -(A1 uA2)) 2 W+(E') for some boundary event E'. Conditions (7.1) and (7.2) are dual in the sense that one condition holds if and only if the other holds for the dual weighting function. To appreciate the above definition, suppose W+ is SA on v and on S. Equation (7.1) means that the union of disjoint -V events "loses" more than the union of the matching disjoint v events. Hence the decision maker is less sensitive to an increase in likelihood in source -V than in source X. Equation (7.2) imposes the dual condition. The comparative SS relation between sources for the same decision maker is reminiscent of the more-SA-than relation between different decision makers for the same source. Both relations reflect departure from expected utility, but they are formally and conceptually different.
Expressed in terms of preferences, (7.1) is equivalent to: (7.3) (x, A1) (x, B1) and (x, A2) (x, B2) implies (x, A1 UA2) a (x, B1 U B2) for any x > O, and (7.2) is equivalent to: (7.4) (x,S -A1) (x,S -B1) and (x,S -A2) (x,S -B2) implies (x, S -(A1 UA2)) X (x, S -(B1 U B2)) for any x > 0, for disjoint A1, A2 and disjoint B1, B2, and under the boundary conditions for (7.1) and (7.2), respectively. The relations of source preference and comparative SS are logically independent. If people prefer one source to another, they can exhibit more or less SS for one source than for the other, or neither.
Turning to losses, we say that the decision maker exhibits less SS to source q than to source v if conditions (7.1) and (7.2) hold for the weighting function for losses. The preference conditions are obtained from (7.3) and (7.4) by interchanging x > O and x < 0, as well as a and i .
Empirical Evidence
We conclude this section by discussing some experimental demonstrations of SA and source preference. We define, for any disjoint events A, B satisfying the appropriate boundary condition, D ( 1.2 than 1, as implied by SA. Second, the sensitivity measure s is significantly smaller for uncertainty (mean= .61) than for risk (mean= .75); 32 out of 40 points lie below the identity line. Third, there is a significant correlation (r = .53) between the sensitivity measure for risk and for uncertainty, suggesting that the degree of SA (as measured by s) is an important attribute that distinguishes among decision makers.
--------------------------
In addition to the indirect comparisons in terms of s described above, Tversky and Fox also tested the preference conditions for comparative SS. The ordinal analysis confirmed the previous conclusion: subjects exhibited less SS for all five uncertain sources than for chance in the sense that (7.3) and (7.4) were satisfied significantly more often in the predicted than in the opposite direction.
Finally, the evidence indicated that some sources were preferred to risk. For example, Stanford students (who lived near San Francisco) preferred to bet on San Francisco temperature than on risk, but they preferred to bet on risk than on Beijing temperature.
In summary, it appears that the characteristics of the weighting function, which have been observed in studies of risk, tend to hold for uncertainty as well. Hence SA emerges as an important descriptive principle for decision under both risk and uncertainty. Furthermore, the finding that people are less sensitive to uncertainty than to risk indicates that uncertainty enhances the departures from expected utility. Studies of choice under risk therefore provide a lower bound for the departure from expected utility caused by nonadditive weights. Finally, the observation that people often prefer to bet on unknown rather than known probabilities calls for a reassessment of the conclusion commonly drawn from Ellsberg's example. It appears that people prefer risk to uncertainty when they are made to feel ignorant or incompetent. However, in other situations people often prefer betting on an uncertain source (e.g., sports or weather) than on risk (Heath and Tversky (1991)). A comprehensive analysis of the causes and consequences of source dependence awaits further theoretical and experimental research. A and B are disjoint; iv1(B, A) and ir2(B, A) are similar. Condition (6.7) is equivalent to W2 = 4 o W1 for a strictly increasing transformation 4, so that will be assumed from now on, and (6.7) is no more discussed. Note also that, because of solvability of both W1 and W2, the transformation 4 is surjective, hence it must be continuous. Conditions (6.5) and (6.6) can be restricted to disjoint A, B, by replacing B by B -A; this will be assumed below without further mention.
To derive equivalence of (i) and ( Thus the equivalence (i) -(ii) has been established. Next we turn to the equivalence (ii) -(iii). First we derive equivalence of (6.5) and (6.8). That (6.5) implies (6.8) follows from substitution of CPT. So we assume (6.8) and derive (6.5). Suppose W1(A U B) < W1(S-E) and
W1(C) = v7l(B, A).
We show that W2(C) ? VO2(B, A). proved. Next we turn to the equivalence (6.6) -* (6.9). That (6.6) implies (6.9) follows from substitution of CPT. So we assume (6.9) and derive (6.6). Suppose W1(A) 2 W1(E') and
7T(C, S-C) = 7T,(B, A).
We show that i7T2(C, S -C) 2 VO2(B, A). Because the weighting function is S-shaped, it is similar to its dual; hence the qualitative predictions of CPT and rank-dependent utility are not very different. The key difference is that reflection implies w+(1/2) < 1/2 w-(1/2) < 1/2, whereas rank-dependent utility implies w+(1/2) < 1/2 w-(1/2) > 1/2. In the study of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the estimated weighting functions for all 25 subjects satisfied the inequalities w+(1/2) < 1/2 and w-(1/2) < 1/2, in accord with CPT.
Much less is known about the relation between the weighting functions for gains and losses in the context of uncertainty. We suspect that the close correspondence observed in the domain of risk may not always hold for uncertainty.
